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ARTICLE
PROMISES, PRACTICES, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
A GLOBAL OVERVIEW
ROGER FINKE*
DANE R. MATAIC**
Relying on recent cross-national data collections, this paper
documents the discrepancy between the promise and practice of
religious freedoms across the globe, reviews new data sources to
better explain why and how religious freedoms are denied, and
explores recent research to identify the consequences of these ac-
tions. We find that, despite constitutional promises of religious
freedom remaining high, the level and severity of the restrictions
on religion have consistently increased for the past twenty-five
years. Societal pressures, government favoritism of a single relig-
ion, an independent judiciary, and free elections all prove to be
strong predictors for the level of religious freedom supported. Fi-
nally, the denial of religious freedom, both the restrictions en-
acted by the state and by societal actors, are associated with
higher levels of violence.
I. PROMISES, PRACTICES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM:
A GLOBAL OVERVIEW
When an unlikely alliance of American religious groups and human
rights activists advocated for improving the state of international religious
freedom in the mid-1990s, they described religious freedom as the over-
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Data Archives (www.thearda.com). He is author of two award-winning books with Rodney Stark.
His most recent books include The Price of Freedom Denied with Brian Grim (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2011) and Faithful Measures: The Art and Science of Measuring Religion with
Christopher Bader (New York University Press, 2017).
** Dane R. Mataic is a postdoctoral research associate in the Department of Sociology at the
Pennsylvania State University. His research explores the intersection of social organizations, relig-
ion, and collective action. His two primary streams of research attempt to understand the occur-
rence of international religious freedoms as well as the mobilization of religious communities.
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looked “orphan of human rights.”1 But if religious freedoms frequently
were overlooked in the policy arena in the 1990s, they were largely ignored
by social scientists, especially among those relying on quantitative data.
Prior to 2000, there virtually were no systematic data collections on relig-
ious freedoms and few studies attempted to understand the relationship re-
ligious freedoms held with the state or the society as a whole. Since 2000,
however, there has been a flurry of data collections on religious freedoms
and a new body of research has begun to emerge.
This paper reviews some of the most significant findings from this new
research. We divide our review into three main areas. First, we offer a de-
scriptive overview of the promise and practice of religious freedoms across
the globe. Here, we document the large gap between the promises of relig-
ious freedoms made in state constitutions and the actual practices that fail to
support these promises. We also chart the increase in religious restrictions
over time.
Second, we review the measures that have received the most research
support for explaining how and why religious freedoms are denied, why
minority religions face open discrimination, and why the gap between
promises and practices is so large. We document that societal pressures,
government favoritism of a single religion, an independent judiciary, and
free elections are some of the strongest predictors.
Third, we look at the consequences of denying religious freedoms. Al-
though some suggest that religious violence and a lack of civility results
from religious freedoms, initial research suggests that religious freedoms
serve to defuse religious conflict. Finally, we close the essay with a brief
discussion on where we go from here. We stress the need for continued
research on the consequences of religious freedoms, the importance of bet-
ter understanding the potential conflicts these freedoms hold with other
civil liberties, and how all of these relationships vary for different religious
minorities.
Before we address these areas, however, we begin with a brief intro-
duction of the data sources and the definitions that guided the measures
used for this review.
A. Data Sources and Definitions
As noted above, the paucity of data on religious freedoms prior to
2000 gave way to multiple data options in the years that followed. The most
significant data collections were conducted by Freedom House,2 the Relig-
ion and State Project at Bar Ilan University,3 the Pew Research Center,4 and
1. ALLEN D. HERTZKE, FREEING GOD’S CHILDREN: THE UNLIKELY ALLIANCE FOR GLOBAL
HUMAN RIGHTS 69 (2004).
2. See generally RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (Paul A. Marshall ed., 2008).
3. See generally JONATHAN FOX, A WORLD SURVEY OF RELIGION AND THE STATE (2008).
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the Association of Religion Data Archives at the Pennsylvania State Uni-
versity.5 Although the collections vary in the research methodologies and
information sources used, their religious freedom measures are highly cor-
related and have produced very similar results.6 The tables for this report
will rely on the Religion and State Project and the Association of Religion
Data Archives (ARDA) data files.7 We also will restrict our coverage to the
approximately 170 nations with a population of 500,000 or more. This in-
cludes the vast majority of the world’s population and allows for more
meaningful comparisons across countries.
These collections offer a vast number of measures on religion’s rela-
tionship with the state and larger society. Together they provide a wealth of
information on how the state and larger society restrict all religions as well
as how some religions receive preferential treatment while others face in-
creased restrictions. We define religious restrictions as restraints that inhibit
the practice, profession, or selection of religion. Government restrictions
result from the official laws, policies, or administrative actions of the state.
Conversely, societal restrictions are enacted by non-state actors, such as
other religious groups, associations, or the culture at large.8 These two mea-
sures allow us to explore how and why religious freedoms are denied by
both state and non-state actors.
A consistent finding from past research, however, is that religious mi-
norities are the most frequent targets of state restrictions and that their free-
4. See generally LUIS LUGO ET AL., PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, GLOBAL
RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION (2009), http://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2009/
12/restrictions-fullreport1.pdf.
5. Brian Grim & Roger Finke, International Religion Indexes: Governmental Regulation,
Government Favoritism, and Social Regulation of Religion, 2 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION,
no. 1, 2006, at 1, http://www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr02001.pdf.
6. BRIAN GRIM & ROGER FINKE, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM DENIED: RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION
AND VIOLENCE (2010); Jonathan Fox, Building Composite Measures of Religion and State, 7 IN-
TERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION, no. 8, 2011, at 1, http://www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr07008.pdf;
Jonathan Fox, Roger Finke & Dane R. Mataic, New Data and Measures on Societal Discrimina-
tion and Religious Minorities, 14 INTERDISC. J. OF RES. ON RELIGION, no. 14, 2018, at 1, http://
www.religjournal.com/pdf/ijrr14014.pdf.
7. These collections are publicly available for download, offer extensive documentation on
how the data were collected, and have been used and evaluated extensively by past research. The
RAS project also covers 24 years, allowing us to chart trends over time. See Data Archive, THE
ARDA, http://www.thearda.com/archive/browse.asp (last visited Jan. 10, 2019); see also
JONATHAN FOX, POLITICAL SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND THE STATE: A TIME SERIES ANALYSIS OF
WORLDWIDE DATA (2015) [hereinafter POLITICAL SECULARISM, RELIGION, AND THE STATE];
JONATHAN FOX, THE UNFREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION: A WORLD SURVEY OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST RELIGIOUS MINORITIES (2016) [hereinafter THE UNFREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION]; FOX,
supra note 3; Fox, supra note 6; Grim & Finke, supra note 5.
8. Extensive examples of societal restrictions exist throughout the world, such as violence
by religious communities or social movements, the destruction of property, and non-violent ac-
tion, such as “preventing the construction or use of buildings for worship.” FOX, FINKE &
MATAIC, supra note 6, at 4, 9–11.
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doms often are the first to be denied.9 Therefore, we will distinguish
between the state’s treatment of religious minorities and the religions fa-
vored by the state. Our measures for religious discrimination against minor-
ities are defined as restrictions placed by governments or their agents on the
religious practices or institutions of religious minorities which are not
placed on the majority religion.
When combined with other cross-national data, these measures offer a
clear window for viewing religious freedoms and restrictions in the global
community.
B. Promises vs. Practices
Article 18 of the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights outlines the international expectations for religious freedom:
“Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”10 In addi-
tion, Article 2 of the Declaration promises that none of the human rights
described in the Declaration can be denied due to a person’s religion.11
These expectations were reinforced and extended in the U.N.’s 1981 Decla-
ration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief. This Declaration provided far more detail on
the international norms and expectations for religious freedoms and led to
the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief in
1986.12
A review of many national constitutions demonstrates that assurances
of religious freedom are common and that Article 18 has served as a model
for many.13 The opening sentence of the European Convention on Human
Rights’ Article 9 is copied directly from the U.N. Declaration.14 Some
countries, such as Ethiopia,15 incorporate Article 18 of the Declaration into
their constitutions word-for-word. Others incorporate only parts of Article
9. See Roger Finke, Robert R. Martin & Jonathan Fox, Explaining Discrimination Against
Religious Minorities, 10 POL. AND RELIGION 389, 390 (2017) (reviewing some of the key sources).
10. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 18 (Dec. 10, 1948).
11. Id. at art. 2.
12. G.A. Res. 36/55, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief, at art. 1 (Nov. 25, 1981).
13. See generally Jonathan Fox & Deborah Flores, Religions, Constitutions, and the State: A
Cross-National Study, 71 J. OF POL. 1499 (2009); Dane R. Mataic & Roger Finke, Compliance
Gaps and the Failed Promises of Religious Freedoms, 47 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 124 (2018),
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09637494.2018.1528788; GRIM & FINKE, supra
note 6.
14. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
15. CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA Dec. 8, 1994, art.
27.
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18, or qualify its provisions with addenda. The Constitution of Guyana,16
for example, combines nearly verbatim restatements of Article 18 with
prefaces stating that freedoms may not be denied “except with [one’s] own
consent.” Indeed, nearly all constitutions provide some religious freedom
assurances. As depicted in Figure 1, about 95 percent of all countries made
at least some religious freedom promise in their constitution between 1990
and 2008.
FIGURE 1. PROMISES AND PRACTICES OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
1990–2008.
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Note: Documents the change in the percent of countries with constitutional promises of
religious freedom and the presence of restrictions on religions from 1990 to 2008. Derived
from the RAS Collection. N = 172 countries.
Despite the strong support given to religious freedoms in national con-
stitutions, however, the state’s support for these freedoms is often lacking.
After comparing constitutional promises of religious freedoms with legisla-
tion restricting religious freedoms, Grim and Finke conclude that “[o]f the
130 countries promising religious freedom, 86 percent (112 countries) have
at least one law denying a religious freedom and 38 percent have four or
more such restrictions.”17 Based on a series of descriptive tables using the
RAS data, Fox and Flores explain that a “large majority of states with relig-
ious freedom clauses in their constitutions engage in actions which are
counter to these clauses.”18 When Fox and Flores entered the constitutional
clauses into a multivariate model predicting religious discrimination and
16. CONSTITUTION OF THE CO-OPERATIVE REPUBLIC OF GUYANA ACT Oct. 6, 1980, art. 145.
17. GRIM & FINKE, supra note 6, at 28.
18. Fox & Flores, supra note 13, at 1505.
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legislation, they concluded that the “clauses have at best a limited impact on
government behavior.”19
The collections also show that the discrepancy between religious free-
dom promises and practices is increasing. As demonstrated in Figure 1,
constitutional assurances of religious freedom have remained high and sta-
ble since 1990. In contrast, global restrictions on religion continue to in-
crease.  The percent of countries with restrictions placed only on minority
religions as well as restrictions placed on all religions increased between
1990 and 2014. The percent of countries with restrictions targeting only
minority religions jumped from 80 to 85 percent, and the restrictions target-
ing all religions increased from 84 to 94 percent.
The severity of the restrictions have also increased over time. Table 1
provides an overview of the changes in restrictions directed toward minor-
ity and all religions in 1990 and 2014.20 In 1990, 47 percent of the countries
held a medium or high level of restrictions targeted at minority religions.
By 2014, however, the percentage jumped to 59 percent, an increase of 12
percentage points in twenty-five years. Moreover, this increase in the level
and severity of restrictions against minorities is a global trend. When we
divided the nations into six major regions, every region had an increase in
the level and severity of the restrictions enforced against minority reli-
gions.21 Each region experienced an increase in the percentage of countries
with medium to high levels of restrictions on minority religions, and each
region decreased in the percentage of countries with no restrictions on mi-
nority religions.
19. Id. at 1499.
20. Some countries were not present in 1990 or 2014; in these instances, values were derived
from their earliest and latest years.
21. The six global regions were Western Democracies, Former USSR, Asia, the Middle East
and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.
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TABLE 1. TRENDS IN THE SEVERITY OF RESTRICTIONS
ON RELIGION, 1990 AND 2014
Global Total
Restrictions on
Minority Religions 1990 2014
None 17% 11%
Low 36% 30%
Medium 23% 28%
High 24% 31%
Restrictions on
All Religions 1990 2014
None 15% 5%
Low 38% 37%
Medium 22% 25%
High 26% 33%
Note: Percentages are based on the number of countries present in 1990
or earliest available and 2014 or latest available. Derived from the RAS
Collection. N = 172 countries.
Similar patterns emerged when documenting the level and severity of
restrictions on all religions. The percentage of countries holding medium or
high levels of restrictions increased from 48 percent in 1990 to 58 percent
in 2014. Once again, this was a global trend. Every region featured a de-
crease in the percent of countries with no restrictions on all religions, and
only one of the six regions showed a decline in the severity of the restric-
tions.22 Table 1 also shows that the greatest increases between 1990 and
2014 in medium and high levels of restrictions occurred within the former
USSR (52 to 62 percent), Asia (47 to 58 percent), and Sub-Saharan Africa
(25 to 49 percent). Overall, the presence of restrictions on all religions con-
tinues to increase in both occurrence and severity.
The restrictions on religions are often enacted through seemingly be-
nign regulations, such as religious registration. Registration is commonly
used as a tool of the state to control the operations of a religious organiza-
tion or to withhold or revoke the group’s right to exist.23 Minimum size, a
minimum number of years in existence, and a long list of other require-
ments often prevent a large swath of religious groups from qualifying for
registration.24 Moreover, because religious registration is frequently admin-
istered by local agencies (e.g., religious bureaus) and the agencies are given
substantial discretion on how to interpret laws for registering, defining, or
tolerating religions, these agencies are especially vulnerable to local social
22. In the Middle East and North Africa, the percentage falling in the “medium” and “high”
levels of restrictions on all religions dropped from 96 percent to 91 percent.
23. See generally Roger Finke, Dane R. Mataic & Jonathan Fox, Assessing the Impact of
Religious Registration, 56 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 720 (2017).
24. Id.
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pressures.25 These registration requirements may be proposed as beneficial
to a religion (e.g., register for tax benefits); however, our recent research
has found a strong relationship between requiring religious groups to regis-
ter and increases in governmental restrictions in subsequent years.26
As shown in Table 2, not only is the percentage of nations requiring
registration increasing (from 40 to 45 percent), there also is a sharp increase
in religious groups facing registration requirements that are different from
other nonprofits (48 percent in 1990 to 60 percent in 2014). The outcomes
and enforcement of these registration requirements also are changing. The
percentage of countries denying registration to some religious groups in-
creased from 24 to 33 percent, and enforcing the registration requirements
increasingly discriminates against those religious groups that are unregis-
tered (14 percent in 1990 to 25 percent in 2014).
TABLE 2. TRENDS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGISTRATION PRACTICES
IN 1990 AND 2014
1990 2014
Requirement for minority religions (as opposed to all
religions) to register in order to be legal or receive 40% 45%
special tax status
A registration process for religious organizations exists
which is in some manner different from the registra- 48% 60%
tion process for other non-profit organizations
The registration process is required but sometimes 24% 33%denied
Government enforces registration requirements and dis- 14% 25%
criminates against unregistered groups
Note: Percentages are based on the number of countries present in 1990 or earliest available
and 2014 or latest available. Derived from the RAS Collection. N = 183 countries.
Regardless of the data collection used, we have found several trends
emerging. Despite constitutional promises of religious freedom remaining
high and stable over time, the restrictions on these freedoms are increas-
ingly high. Both the number of restrictions and the severity of the restric-
tions on religion have been increasing over the past twenty-five years.
Moreover, the increase has occurred across the globe, reaching into every
global region. We offer religious registration requirements as one example
of how government restrictions can deny religious freedoms and docu-
mented how these requirements are increasing. Each of these trends raises
questions on how and why religious freedoms are denied. Below we review
25. ANTHONY J. GILL, THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 13–15 (2008); KARRIE
KOESEL, RELIGION AND AUTHORITARIANISM: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND THE CONSEQUENCES
18–21, 64 (2014); GRIM & FINKE, supra note 6, at 36–40.
26. Finke, Mataic & Fox, supra note 23, at 735.
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a few of the answers that are emerging from a rapidly growing body of
research and we offer tables and charts to support these arguments.27
C. Why are the Freedoms Denied?
Research efforts to understand the vast disconnect between promises
and practices of religious freedom and the recent rise in religious restric-
tions have focused on both social and political origins. Some findings stress
the religious, social, and cultural pressures within the nation, others stress
the internal governance of the nation, and still others look to the impact of
international pressures.28
The religious, social, and cultural pressures within the nation can arise
from formal or informal alliances. The formal alliance between a majority
religion and the state is the most obvious. For the dominant religion, this
alliance often provides subsidies, status, and other privileges not granted to
other religions. For state leaders, the alliances are often a necessity for se-
curing political survival. The end result of the alliance is that the dominant
religion has a competitive advantage over other religious and cultural
groups.29 One way to demonstrate alliances between a majority religion and
the state is through the level of government favoritism within a country.30
Using data from the ARDA collection, Table 3 presents the associa-
tions between both government favoritism and the level of government re-
strictions. The highest percentages of countries with medium and high
levels of government restrictions are among those with medium and high
levels of government favoritism. In fact, of the forty-one countries with
medium levels of government favoritism, 54 percent have medium or high
levels of government restrictions. Similarly, of the forty-one countries with
high levels of government favoritism, 66 percent have medium or high
levels of government restrictions. The difference is drastic when compared
to the countries with no government favoritism. Of the twenty-nine coun-
tries with no favoritism, only 14 percent have medium or high levels of
government restrictions. Similar patterns are found among countries with
low levels of favoritism: only 33 percent have medium or high levels of
government restrictions.
27. THE UNFREE EXERCISE OF Religion, supra note 7, at 12–27 (providing detail of a variety
of explanations for why governments restrict religious freedoms).
28. See generally Dane R. Mataic, Countries Mimicking Neighbors: The Spatial Diffusion of
Governmental Restrictions on Religion, 57 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 221 (2018).
29. For an in-depth discussion on how and why these alliances form, as well as the conse-
quence of these alliances, see GILL, supra note 25.
30. Roger Finke & Robert R. Martin, Ensuring Liberties: Understanding State Restrictions
on Religious Freedoms, 53 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 687, 695 (2014).
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TABLE 3. SOCIAL RESTRICTIONS, GOVERNMENT FAVORITISM AND
RESTRICTIONS ON RELIGION, 2008
Government Restrictions on Religion Index
None Low Medium High
Government Favoritism of
Religion Index
None (N=29) 55% 31% 4% 10%
Low (N=55) 53% 15% 15% 18%
Medium (N=41) 22% 24% 32% 22%
High (N=41) 22% 12% 24% 42%
Social Restrictions on
Religion Index
None (N=59) 73% 18% 3% 8%
Low (N=40) 55% 18% 14% 14%
Medium (N=46) 24% 27% 20% 20%
High (N=53) 0% 15% 32% 54%
Note: Derived from the ARDA Collection. N = 166 countries.
Even without formal alliances, however, religious institutions and the
larger culture can sway the actions of the state. Working through social and
political movements, as well as more formal political and religious institu-
tions and leaders, the majority groups can reduce religious freedoms by
advocating for formal legislation or by applying informal pressures to local
institutions. Social and cultural pressures can lead state agencies to actively
deny freedoms through formal state actions, or the agencies can simply
overlook the violations of promised freedoms. In either case, the freedoms
are denied. Evidence of these pressures has been documented at length in
qualitative research and formal documents reporting on religious
freedoms.31
The strong relationship between social restrictions on religion and gov-
ernment restrictions on religion is presented in the bottom half of Table 3.
Of the fifty-nine countries with no social restrictions on religion, 91 percent
have no or low levels of government restrictions on religion. Conversely, of
the fifty-three countries with high levels of social restrictions, zero percent
have no government restrictions, and only 15 percent have low levels of
government restrictions on religion. Thus, both social restrictions and gov-
ernment favoritism of a select religion(s) hold close relationships with gov-
ernment restrictions on religion.
31. See generally U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R. and Lab., International
Religious Freedom Report (2016); Asma Jahangir (Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or
Belief), Report of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/
21 (Dec. 26, 2006); James T. Richardson & Massimo Introvigne, “Brainwashing” Theories in
European Parliamentary and Administrative Reports on “Cults” and “Sects”, 40 J. FOR THE SCI.
STUDY OF RELIGION 143 (2001); RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN THE WORLD, supra note 2.
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How nations are governed also have proven influential in states sup-
porting or denying religious freedoms.32 Although free elections often are
touted as the most essential component of a democracy, an independent
judiciary often has been found to have an even stronger influence on the
support of religious freedom.33 Using global examples, James T. Richard-
son illustrates how the autonomy of courts can serve to protect religious
minorities from the whims of leaders and the legislative power of majori-
ties.34 Table 4 provides a descriptive overview showing the patterns of in-
dependent judiciary and government restrictions of religion. Sixty-nine
percent of the countries with a partially to generally independent judiciary
are associated with zero to low levels of government restrictions. Con-
versely, in the countries without an independent judiciary, 55 percent of the
countries have medium to high levels of restrictions.
TABLE 4. GOVERNANCE DIMENSIONS AND RESTRICTIONS
ON RELIGION, 2008
Government Restrictions on Religion Index
None Low Medium High
Independent of Judiciary
Partially to generally inde-
pendent (N=83) 48% 21% 22% 10%
Not independent (N=79) 28% 18% 18% 37%
Free and Open Elections
Moderately free and open
elections, both in law and
practice (N=88) 57% 22% 17% 5%
Free and open elections
do not exist (N=74) 16% 16% 23% 45%
Note: Derived from the ARDA Collection and the CIRI datasets. N = 162 countries.
Relying on the RAS and ARDA collections, similar findings have been
replicated using a variety of more advanced statistical models.35 Finke and
Martin utilized regression models, consistently finding a significant rela-
tionship between the presence of an independent judiciary and reduced
levels of restrictions on religion.36 Finke and colleagues also found that
restrictions on all religions in the year following the implementation of an
32. See generally Finke & Martin, supra note 30; Finke, Mataic & Fox, supra note 23;
Mataic, supra note 28; Mataic & Finke, supra note 13.
33. See generally Finke & Martin, supra note 30; Mataic & Finke, supra note 13.
34. See generally James T. Richardson, Managing Religion and the Judicialization of Relig-
ious Freedom, 54 J. FOR THE SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 1 (2015); James T. Richardson, The Sociol-
ogy of Religious Freedom: A Structural and Socio-Legal Analysis, 67 SOC. OF RELIGION 271
(2006).
35. See, e.g., Finke, Martin & Fox, supra note 9; Finke & Martin, supra note 30; Finke,
Mataic & Fox, supra note 23; Mataic & Finke, supra note 13.
36. See generally Finke & Martin, supra note 30.
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independent judiciary were significantly reduced.37 These relationships
highlighted the importance of an independent judiciary in monitoring and
maintaining the states’ promises of religious freedoms.38
While not as strong as the independent judiciary in predicting the level
of government restrictions on religion, the presence of free and open elec-
tions also allows social actors to monitor and help maintain the states’
promises of religious freedoms. Mataic found that the presence of free and
open elections is significantly related to decreased levels of restrictions of
minority religions.39 Moreover, the introduction of free and open elections
in one year is significantly related to decreased levels of restrictions on
minority religions in subsequent years.40 We document similar patterns us-
ing the ARDA collection and the presence of free and open elections in
2008 (Table 4). Of the countries with free and open elections, 79 percent
have none or low levels of government regulation on religion. Conversely,
of the countries where free and open elections do not exist, only 36 percent
have none or low levels. As the governance of a state encourages the moni-
toring of its actions through the independent judiciary and free and open
elections, the protection of religious rights is maintained and protected.
Mataic and Finke recently identified the discrepancy between promises and
practices as the religious freedom compliance gap conducted extensive
analysis using two measures of this compliance gap and concluded that “up-
holding these promises is reliant on the religious economy of the nation
(e.g., state favoritism and social pressures) and the specific types of govern-
ance used (e.g., free elections and an independent judiciary).”41
While the above explanations for increased restrictions and reduced
freedoms for religion focus on the internal characteristics of a country (e.g.,
the social actors or presence of independent judiciary), a third important
explanation is the influence of neighboring states. Building upon research
on the spread of democracies and human rights protections,42 Mataic ap-
plied diffusion theories43 to explain how restrictions on religious minorities
37. Finke, Mataic & Fox, supra note 23, at 734.
38. See generally Mataic & Finke, supra note 13.
39. Mataic, supra note 28, at 233.
40. See Finke, Mataic & Fox, supra note 23.
41. Mataic & Finke, supra note 13, at 1.
42. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DO-
MESTIC POLITICS (2009); KRISTIAN SKREDE GLEDITSCH & MICHAEL D. WARD, SPATIAL REGRES-
SION MODELS (2008); Jason Beckfield, The Social Structure of the World Polity, 115 AM. J. OF
SOC. 1018 (2010); Heather Berry, Mauro F. Guille´n & Arun S. Hendi, Is there Convergence
Across Countries? A Spatial Approach, 45 J. OF INT’L BUS. STUD. 387 (2014); Kristian Skrede
Gleditsch & Michael D. Ward, Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization, 60
INT’L ORG. 911 (2006); Barbara Wejnert, Diffusion, Development, and Democracy, 1800–1999,
70 AM. SOC. REV. 53 (2005).
43. Diffusion theories, particularly when applied to government policies, argue that some of
the governmental policies spread globally. While many arguments exist for how these spread, a
common approach emphasizes external sources, or the influence of an external actor, on the adop-
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spread between countries’ borders.44 While Figure 1 depicts the global
change in restrictions on minority religions, Figure 2 demonstrates how the
increases and decreases over time occur in distinct locations. As represented
in Figure 2, increases in the governmental restrictions on minority religions
occurred in the countries surrounding China, the former USSR, and the
Middle East. Decreases in the number of restrictions also occurred reflect-
ing the changing levels of neighbors, such as the decrease in restrictions
among Bolivia following shifts in Brazil (Figure 2). Mataic went on to
demonstrate that this clustering was robust even when accounting for inter-
nal characteristics (e.g., favoritism of religion and governance), changes in
distances between countries, and the classification of neighbors.45 Ulti-
mately, the strongest relationship of diffusion occurred between the imme-
diate neighbors.46
FIGURE 2. CHANGE IN AVERAGE GOVERNMENTAL RESTRICTIONS
ON MINORITY RELIGIONS, 1990-2008
SOURCE: MATAIC (2018)
Note: Depicts the average level of governmental restrictions for 155 countries during four
periods: 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2008. Derived from the RAS
Collection.
tion of policies within a country. Thus, over time, policies between countries tend to look similar.
See Mataic, supra note 28, at 224–25.
44. See id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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The above overview highlights a few of the important reasons for the
spread of restrictions on religion and the growing gap between promises of
religious freedom and practices. Also important, however, is understanding
the consequences of these growing restrictions.
D. What are the Consequences of the Freedoms Denied?
When Samuel P. Huntington introduced his Clash of Civilizations the-
sis, he concluded that “multiculturalism at home threatens the United States
and the West; universalism abroad threatens the West and the world.”47
This powerful thesis suggests that maintaining a religious and cultural ho-
mogeneity is essential for keeping the peace.48 Although research is more
limited in this area, the initial findings suggest that although religion and
civilization divides can serve to heighten tensions and increase conflict, re-
ligious freedoms serve to defuse the tensions and reduce the conflict.
Religious persecution serves as one example.49 Contrary to the Clash
of Civilizations thesis, religious dominance is associated with greater levels
of religious persecution. Figure 3 provides a visual overview of the level of
dominance by the number of religious groups (none, one, or two) and the
level of religious persecution. Of the thirty-three countries with no domi-
nant religion, 64 percent had zero cases of religious persecution and none
had more than two hundred instances of religious persecution. For countries
dominated by one religion, however, 19 percent of the fifty-two countries
had two hundred or more instances of religious persecution.
FIGURE 3. THE LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION BY RELIGIOUS
DOMINANCE, 2003–2008
64%
36%
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Religious
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47. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAK-
ING OF WORLD ORDER 318 (1996).
48. Id.
49. Religious persecution includes instances where people are physically abused, displaced,
imprisoned, killed, and injured because of their religious affiliation.
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State restrictions on religion also are positively associated with relig-
ious persecution: higher levels of religious restrictions are associated with
more religious persecution. Figure 4 demonstrates this relationship. Sev-
enty-one percent of the countries with no government restrictions on relig-
ion (38) featured zero cases of persecution compared to 25 percent of the
countries with medium (32) or high (48) levels of government restrictions.
At the extreme, 21 percent of the countries with high government restric-
tions featured an average of more than two hundred cases of persecution.
For countries with no and low government restrictions, the average was
three and four percent respectively. Although government restrictions on
religion are often justified in an effort to reduce tensions and conflict, re-
search suggests that the opposite occurs; government restrictions are associ-
ated with higher levels of tension and conflict.
FIGURE 4. THE LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION BY GOVERNMENT
RESTRICTIONS, 2003–2008
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Note: Depicts the percent of countries associated with categories of religious persecution by
the level of government regulation aggregated from 2003, 2005, and 2008. Derived from the
ARDA Collection. N = 165 countries.
Using multivariate models and controlling for competing explanations,
other research has more fully demonstrated the strong connection between
restrictions and conflict. Grim and Finke found an ongoing cycle of perse-
cution: social restrictions lead to higher levels of government restrictions,
which in turn lead to persecution that is more violent.50 Following the
heightened violent persecution, religious groups respond with heightened
social restrictions. Thus, rather than preventing conflict, they find that in-
50. See Brian J. Grim & Roger Finke, Religious Persecution in Cross-National Context:
Clashing Civilizations, or Regulated Religious Economies?, 72 AM. SOC. REV. 633, 654 (2007).
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creased government restrictions create a cycle of increased conflict result-
ing in a call for more restrictions.51
Although the research is limited, initial work suggests that a similar
relationship holds between religious freedom and religion-related vio-
lence.52 Rather than focusing on religion as the victim of violence, this
measure includes violence where religious actors are both the perpetrators
and victims. Social restrictions, rather than governmental restrictions, are
the strongest predictor for the measure of religion-related violence. As illus-
trated in Table 5, Finke and Martin demonstrate the associations between
both government and social restrictions on violence within a country during
2004 and 2005.53 Forty-five percent of the countries with high levels of
government restrictions on religion also experienced violent social conflict
and widespread religion-related violence. Yet, for countries where restric-
tions were low, 20 percent had violent social conflict. Most striking is that
of the thirty countries with low government restrictions on religion, zero
percent had widespread religion-related violence.
TABLE 5. RELIGIOUS FREEDOMS AND SOCIAL VIOLENCE, 2004–2005
SOURCE: FINKE AND MARTIN 2012
Violent Social Religion-Related
Conflict is Present Violence is
(ISC=1) Widespread
Government Restrictions on
Religion Index
Low (N=30) 20% 0%
Medium (N=58) 26% 21%
High (N=51) 45% 45%
Social Restrictions on
Religion Index
Low (N=38) 5% 8%
Medium (N=49) 33% 12%
High (N=52) 50% 50%
Note: The ISC measure is a composite from the years 2004 and 2005 from the Major Epi-
sodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset and the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project
dataset. If a country was host to a social conflict, it received a score of 1. The other measures
are derived from the ARDA Collection. N = 139 countries.
51. Id.
52. ROGER FINKE & ROBERT R. MARTIN, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CONFLICT: A REVIEW OF
THE EVIDENCE (2012), http://www.thearda.com/workingpapers/download/USAID%20Religion%
20and%20Conflict%20Final%20Report%209-18-12.pdf (report prepared for the USAID Conflict
Management and Mitigation Office); Roger Finke & Jaime Harris, Wars and Rumors of Wars:
Explaining Religiously Motivated Violence, in RELIGION, POLITICS, SOCIETY, AND THE STATE
(Jonathan Fox ed., 2012).
53. FINKE & MARTIN, supra note 52.
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As seen in Table 5, similar patterns emerge when addressing social
restrictions on religion. Fifty percent of the countries with high levels of
social restrictions featured violent social conflict and widespread religion-
related violence. Very few countries with low levels of social restrictions on
religion featured violent social conflict or widespread religion-related vio-
lence. Only 5 percent of countries with low restrictions were host to violent
social conflict, while only 8 percent experienced widespread religion-re-
lated violence. Much like the measure of religious persecution, countries
with high levels of religious freedoms, both state and societal, are associ-
ated with reduced levels of violence.
E. Where Do We Go from Here?
We have reported a few consistent findings on religious freedoms, but
existing research has only begun to explore the newfound wealth of data.
Below, we mention three areas in need of more research: 1) continued re-
search on the consequences of denying religious freedoms; 2) the relation-
ships religious freedoms hold with other civil liberties; and 3) how religious
freedoms and the consequences of these freedoms vary for different relig-
ious minorities.  We recognize, of course, that many other areas are in need
of exploration.
Despite the obvious importance it holds for policy, there has been re-
markably little social science research on the consequences of religious
freedoms. As reviewed above, initial research has found that religious free-
doms are negatively associated with social conflict; and the relationships
reported are consistent and clear: greater state and societal restrictions on
religion correspond with widespread persecution and religion-related vio-
lence.54 Yet, the types of conflicts measured have been limited to religious
persecution and religion-related violence.55 Many questions remain. Will
the relationship between freedoms and conflict vary for different forms of
social conflict? For example, does the relationship vary by the type of con-
flict or the severity of conflict? Closely related, to what extent are religions
actively involved or engaged in the conflict? Are religious groups and their
beliefs driving the conflict; or is religion simply a social, ethnic, economic,
or political marker that serves as an identifier?
Second, beyond the consequences of religious freedoms on social con-
flict, we need to better understand the relationship that religious freedoms
hold with other human rights. A positive and significant correlation exists
between the religious freedoms in a nation and other human rights, but the
strength of the relationship varies for different liberties.56 For many, the
goals of human rights and religious freedoms are closely aligned. Returning
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. GRIM & FINKE, supra note 6, at 206.
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to the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, we find that
Article 18 on religious freedom clearly overlaps with the two articles that
follow. Freedom to hold, to teach, and to change religious beliefs in public
or private might be viewed as a more specific example of the freedom of
opinion and expression (Article 19).57 The freedom to worship and observe
religion publicly overlaps with the freedom of peaceful assembly and asso-
ciation (Article 20).58 Yet for others, such as women or LGBT rights
groups, tensions often arise.59 The extent of the conflict, and the level of
priority given to each human right, is a hotly debated topic that would bene-
fit from more systematic research.
Third, the experiences of different religious minority groups within a
country also are ripe for continued social science research. Scholars regu-
larly acknowledge that the experiences by one minority religious group may
differ from those of another,60 yet few have explored variations in the socie-
tal and governmental religious discrimination directed at minority groups
around the world. Similarly, the sources of societal restrictions on religion
may vary depending on the country, religious groups, or demographics.
Most research on societal restrictions has focused on the actions and atti-
tudes of the majority religions or the state, but societal discrimination can
arise from many other sources, such as minority religions and a plethora of
secular sources.61 Insight is still needed into behavioral restrictions of non-
state actors against minority religions as well as how minority religions
respond to these restrictions.
As it stands, social science researchers have used the wealth of data on
global religious restrictions and freedoms to understand its presence,
growth, and consequences. Importantly, as new datasets emerge and contin-
ued emphases on state-religion relations occur, attention also can be di-
rected to understudied topics, such as other forms of conflict, overlap with
other human rights, and the unique experiences of non-state actors and re-
ligious minorities.
II. CONCLUSION
Until recently, the most systematic reporting on religion and state rela-
tions were provided by government reports and advocacy groups. As a re-
sult, research on religious freedoms were rare and the research that was
57. G.A. Res. 1948, supra note 10, at art. 19.
58. Id. at art. 20.
59. See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS
(Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008).
60. See generally Jonathan Fox, Roger Finke & Marie Eisenstein, Examining the Causes of
Government-Based Discrimination Against Religious Minorities in Western Democracies: Socie-
tal-Level Discrimination and Securitization, COMP. EUR. POL. 1 (2018), https://link.springer.com/
article/10.1057/s41295-018-0134-1; THE UNFREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION, supra note 7; Fox,
Finke & Mataic, supra note 6.
61. Fox, Finke & Mataic, supra note 6, at 4, 20–21, 26.
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conducted often focused on individual nations or regions. Offering global
overviews or documenting historical trends relied more on speculation than
evidence, and testing the relationships religious freedoms held with other
global developments were not possible. The new sources of data, however,
allow us to draw several conclusions with confidence. We have organized
our conclusions into three main areas: 1) documenting the chasm between
the promise and practice of religious freedom; 2) explaining why and how
religious freedoms are denied; and 3) reviewing the consequences of deny-
ing religious freedoms.
We found that the chasm between the promise and practice of religious
freedoms is wide and growing wider.  Despite 95 percent of all nations
offering constitutional assurances of religious freedom, the level of restric-
tions and the severity of the restrictions on religion are increasing—a trend
that is occurring in all regions of the globe and for all religions. We also
find that many of these restrictions are enacted through seemingly benign
regulations, such as the registration process. The increased use of religious
registration combined with the mounting requirements associated with the
process offer a telling example of how restrictions on religion are enacted.62
The end result is that the gap between constitutional promises of religious
freedoms and state practices continues to grow.
Research explaining why and how religious freedoms are denied has
found that government favoritism toward select religions, societal pres-
sures, governance dimensions, and the policies of nearby nations all hold a
strong relationship with the government restrictions placed on religion. As
expected, governments often fail to support religious freedoms when there
are strong social pressures against minority religions, or when a majority
religion has formed an alliance with the state.
The type of governance also makes a difference. States supporting an
independent judiciary as well as free and open elections allow continued
monitoring of state behaviors, resulting in fewer restrictions on religion and
more religious freedom. State governments also learn from their neighbors
over time. As the growth of restrictions in one country emerges, neighbor-
ing countries follow, engaging in greater levels of restrictive practices in
subsequent years.
Finally, we find that denying religious freedoms are associated with
increased social conflicts. This finding contrasts sharply with policies sug-
gesting that religions must be regulated to reduce conflict.  The data re-
viewed as well as past research found that religious freedoms defuse
tensions and reduce conflict.  This finding, in particular, highlights the im-
portance of continued research on understanding the sources and conse-
quences of denying religious freedoms. Although much research remains,
62. Finke, Mataic & Fox, supra note 23, at 723–28.
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the rich new data sources have shown that the price of denying religious
freedoms is high.
